Conflict of Laws - Status of Foreign Statute - Non-Recognition of Support Obligation by Berg, David C., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 57 Issue 1 
1958 
Conflict of Laws - Status of Foreign Statute - Non-Recognition of 
Support Obligation 
David C. Berg S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, and the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David C. Berg S.Ed., Conflict of Laws - Status of Foreign Statute - Non-Recognition of Support Obligation, 
57 MICH. L. REV. 116 (1958). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/8 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
116 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
CONFLICT OF LAWS-STATUS OF FOREIGN STATUTE-NON-RECOGNITION OF 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION-The State of California, Department of Mental Hy-
giene, brought suit in Texas against defendant, a California resident until 
his removal to Texas in 1954, to recover money expended by the state in 
support of defendant's mother, an incompetent inmate of a California state 
institution since 1944. California law requires an adult son to contribute to 
his parents' support1 while a similar provision of the Texas law imposes 
such an obligation on a parent but not on a child.2 In accordance with the 
applicable California statute of limitations,3 the state sued for the monthly 
payments which had accrued during the four-year period immediately pre-
1 Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §6650. 
2 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1952) art. 3196a. 
3 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953) §345. 
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ceding the filing of suit. The trial court's judgment for the full amount 
claimed was reversed by the court of civil appeals, which held that the en-
forcement of the claim for the period after defendant moved to Texas 
would violate the public policy of Texas, and that the forum's two-year 
statute of limitations applied to that portion of the claim maturing before 
defendant's removal to Texas. On appeal, held, affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, three judges dissenting. California cannot by statute impose 
a continuing obligation on defendant which will be enforced for the period 
after the defendant became domiciled in Texas; but California may re-
cover payments accruing while defendant was a California citizen and 
within four years of suit, as the California statute of limitations applies 
and maintenance of the suit with judgment for these accrued amounts is not 
against the public policy of Texas. California v. Copus, (Tex. 1958) 
309 S.W. (2d) 227, cert. den. 356 U.S. 967 (1958). 
Until recently the attitude of a state toward support obligations cre-
ated by the statute of a sister state was manifested by the rule: "No state 
will directly enforce a duty to support created by the law of another state."4 
That this attitude has undergone a reformation is indicated by the adop-
tion of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act by a majority 
of the states, including both Texas and California.5 Nevertheless, in the 
principal case the majority reasoned that to enforce the statute for the pe-
riod after defendant became a resident of Texas would deprive him of 
equal protection of the laws. Since Texas law does not impose a compa-
rable support obligation, it was felt that defendant would be denied 
equality with other Texas citizens if the California obligation was enforced 
against him by the Texas court.6 This argument, however, apparently fails 
to recognize that the constitutional requirement of equal protection applies 
only to all persons similarly situated. Defendant, having previously been a 
California resident, is not similarly situated with Texas citizens who have 
never resided elsewhere and who have never been subject to the laws of 
another jurisdiction. Thus for the Texas court to hold defendant liable 
for the California support obligation after his removal to Texas would 
not seem to constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. As pointed 
out by the dissent, a reasonable classification of defendant under California 
law should not become unreasonable merely by virtue of his crossing state 
4 CONFLICT OF LAws REsTATEMENT §458 (1934). 
5 Ehrenzweig, "Interstate Recognition of Support Duties," 42 CALIF. L. REv. 382 
(1954); Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1950, Supp. 1957) art. 2328b; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 
1953) §1650 et seq. This action could have been ,brought within the terms of the Uniform 
Act, but California made no attempt to comply with the act. 
6 This same reasoning controlled the decision in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex 
rel. Department of Public Assistance, Mercer County Board of Assistance v. Mong, 160 
Ohio St. 455, 117 N.E. (2d) 32 (1954), brought under the Uniform Act. The case is dis-
tinguishable from the principal case in that the defendant was not domiciled in the 
imposing state when the obligation arose. For a criticism of the basis for the decision, 
see 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 938 (1954). 
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lines.7 Setting aside this constitutional objection, it is clear that a valid judg-
ment for support is not vitiated by the obligor's removal from the state 
rendering it.8 In furtherance of the doctrine of comity, there seems to be 
no reason for drawing a distinction for a statutory obligation, and the de-
cision of the Texas court is open to some question. In addition, the legis-
lative policy of Texas as evidenced by adoption of the Uniform Act and 
more recently by imposition of a secondary obligation of support upon an 
adult son9 would have been effectuated through enforcement of the foreign 
statute.10 
While a convincing argument can thus be made to justify enforcement 
of the California statute by Texas out of comity, a further argument can be 
advanced that its enforcement is required by the full faith and credit 
clause.U Cases such as the principal case have rarely arisen,12 and conse-
quently this constitutional issue has not been presented for decision. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the term "public acts" as used in the 
full faith and credit clause includes statutory enactments,13 and has held 
that statutes in certain selected areas are subject to the full faith and credit 
requirement. The extent to which the requirement may be broadened is 
not certain, but it has been indicated that in cases involving exclusive legis-
lative jurisdiction in the foreign state, the Supreme Court will not uphold 
a refusal to enforce the foreign law if the full faith and credit issue is prop-
erly raised.14 However, in the principal case both California and Texas 
might be recognized as having legislative jurisdiction, and with the excep-
tion of the workmen's compensation cases15 the Supreme Court has avoided 
7 Principal case at 235. 
s Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. I (1910). 
9 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1956) Prob. Code §423. 
10 And see Dainow, "Policy Problems in Conflicts Cases," 35 True. L. REv. 759 (1957), 
cited by both the majority and dissent to support the conclusion that the public policy 
of Texas did not bar this action. 
11 "Full Faith and Credit shall ,be given in each State to the public ·Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CoNsr., art. IV, §1. Cf. Tennessee 
Coal, I. & R. Co. v. George, 11 Ga. App. 221, 75 S.E. 567 (1912), affd. 233 U.S. 354 (1914), 
where it was said that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, and the laws 
of Congress enacted pursuant thereto, require the courts of the several states to enforce 
any transitory cause of action created by a statute of a sister state, not opposed to the 
settled policy of the state wherein it is sought to enforce the cause of action. 
12 The principal case was a case of first impression in Texas, and the dissent indicated 
that it might very well be a case of first impression in the United States. A similar case 
came before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
v. Tappan, 215 Minn. 22, 9 N.W. (2d) 18 (1943), in which the court decided that the 
foreign statute was not applicable to the defendant. 
13 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615 (1887); Broderick v. Rosner, 
294 U.S. 629 (1935); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Nadelmann, "Full Faith and 
Credit to Judgments and Public Acts," 56 MrcH. L. REv. 33 (1957). 
14 Sumner, "The Status of Public Acts in Sister States,'' 3 U.CL.A. L. REv. I (1955). 
15 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Magnolia Petroleum 
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 
U.S. 622 (1947). 
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the choice of law ·problem presented by such a situation.16 Therefore, it 
would be difficult to speculate on the success of the full faith and credit 
argument if it were presented in the setting of a support case, whatever its 
merits may be. It should be noted that the choice of law problem illustrated 
by the principal case has not been completely eliminated by the adoption 
of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, since the section 
of that act which purports to offer a solution is subject to constitutional 
attack,17 and some states accordingly have altered it by amendment. To the 
extent that this problem will arise in the future, however, current public 
policy would seem to call for enforcement of the foreign support statute. 
David C. Berg, S.Ed . 
• 
16 Sumner, "The Status of Public Acts in Sister States," 3 U.C.L.A. L. R.Ev. I (1955). 
17 The controversial provision is §7, which gives the obligee an election to claim a 
duty of support imposed by the law of the state where the obligor was present during 
the period for which support is sought, or by the law of the state where the obligee was 
present when the failure to support commenced. For a discussion of the constitutionality 
of this provision, see Brockelbank, "Is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act Constitutional?" 31 ORE. L. R.Ev. 97 (1952). 
